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Is N ature E nough? M ean in g an d Truth in the A g e o f Science, by John F. Haught.

Cambridge University Press, 2006. 223 pages. $70.00 (hardback), $19.99
(paperback).
PAUL C. ANDERS, University of Wisconsin-Madison
In this book, John Haught argues that, due to the limitations of scientific
explanation, no one science, nor all sciences taken as a whole, can give ul
timate explanations of the natural world. Therefore, scientific naturalism
is irrational in that it actually undermines the scientific enterprise. Much
in these claims needs clarification. Haught understands naturalism to be
a worldview consisting in the metaphysical beliefs that the natural world
is all that exists, and so, nature is self-originating and purposeless. Fur
thermore, life and mind are unintended evolutionary accidents, and there
is "no reasonable prospect for conscious human survival beyond death"
(p. 9). In addition, scientific naturalism includes the epistemological beliefs
that all causes are natural causes open in principle to scientific investiga
tion, and that all features of life, including human life and production, can
be ultimately explained in scientific (evolutionary) terms. Haught is clear
to distinguish scientific naturalism from science, the latter being "a fruitful
but self-limiting way of learning some things about the world" (p. 6).
Haught sees in scientific naturalism a kind of explanatory monism,
which expresses the belief that all explanations of natural phenomena
must be scientifically accessible, explanations cohering to and arising out
of the scientific method. He rejects this view of explanation, arguing that
a multi-layered account, or explanatory pluralism, is required for even
approaching an "ultimate" explanation of any natural phenomena. His
argument consists in discussing certain "easily accessible" features of the
natural world (e.g., religion, intelligence, life, and emergence). He de
scribes how these features would be explained from the perspective of
scientific naturalism, and then raises doubts about whether such explana
tions "can ever lead to the fullest possible understanding of the particular
phenomena in question" (p. 20).
Haught's argument for rejecting scientific naturalism focuses on two
main ideas: that mentality (subjectivity) is a product of the natural world;
and that the anticipatory nature of mind is not distinct from the natural
world, but only the most prominent expression to date of the fundamental
makeup of the cosmos itself. The link between mind and nature is the focal
point of his critique. Since mind is an emergent part of the natural world,
and so understanding mind allows us to more fully understand the nature
of the universe, mind must be a primary focus of any "ultimate" under
standing of nature. However, according to Haught, science cannot admit
the study of the subjective mind. For this reason, a scientific approach to
nature cannot fu lly explain any natural phenomenon. He argues, "What
naturalism overlooks, . . . is that you can understand the universe in depth
only if you take into account, starting with yourself, the subjective "in
sideness" of nature that science usually leaves out of consideration. A full
understanding of the universe is inseparable from the project of coming to
terms with your own critical intelligence" (p. 29).
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Critical intelligence, an emergent property in nature, is the fundamental
feature of subjectivity. Following the work of Bernard Lonergan, Haught
lays out what he takes to be the "cognitional structure" of mind. Describ
ing the cognitive make-up of the mind, Haught insists, "your mind cannot
help passing through the three distinct but complementary acts: experi
ence, understanding and judgment. This is because there are persistent
and ineradicable imperatives at the foundation of your consciousness"
(p. 33). The imperatives and the cognitional acts that go with them are
the outflow of what Haught refers to as "the desire to know." The desire
to know produces the imperatives to be attentive, intelligent, critical, and
responsible. These imperatives give rise to the cognitional acts of experi
ence, understanding, judgment, and decision, respectively.
The desire to know, according to Haught, is fundamentally anticipa
tory. Critical intelligence expresses the desire to attain truth. Following
the imperatives of the mind, critical intelligence anticipates and searches
for truth that is independent of the mind. It is following the imperatives
of the mind that has given rise to scientific inquiry. But science alone can
not explain how, or why, these imperatives to attain truth emerged. Since
scientific naturalism limits explanation to science alone, the scientific nat
uralist cannot explain why one should engage in science.
Haught argues that science (i.e., evolutionary theory) alone cannot ex
plain critical intelligence because, on a naturalist account, the anticipatory
desire to know truth cannot be adaptive. Evolutionary theory, as with all
science, seeks to explain complex phenomena via simpler, antecedent phe
nomena. However, the anticipation of truth that is fundamental to critical
intelligence is a forward-looking aspect of mind. Here, Haught must be
differentiating an instrumental use of the ability to anticipate future oc
currences based on the law-like regularities in nature, which clearly seems
highly adaptive, from a desire to know the world as it actually exists. Ac
cording to Haught, critical intelligence is only adaptive if there is an ulti
mate (final or everlasting) truth to which it is drawn. Since nature, being
contingent, cannot give rise to ultimate truth, an evolutionary explanation
of critical intelligence requires a wider perspective than scientific natural
ism allows. Furthermore, since mind is a feature of the natural world, the
anticipatory nature of mind must be attributed to all of nature. If this is the
case, then scientific explanation in general requires a wider perspective
than scientific naturalism allows. Therefore, scientific naturalism should
be rejected.
Haught goes into much more detail in trying to defend, for example,
his claim that mind is fundamentally anticipatory. He discusses, following
Bergson, Polanyi, Whitehead, Lonergan and Teilhard, the need for a "rich
er empiricism" that would bring subjectivity under the purview of science.
He considers important issues concerning the interaction of science and
religion such as morality, suffering, and death. There is definitely much to
commend in Haught's goals and his attempts to achieve those goals.
However, there are also some problematic positions taken. I would like
to focus on two in the space I have left. First, while I agree with Haught's
call for explanatory pluralism, there are problems with his depiction of
how different levels of explanation are related. Haught uses an example
of a pot of water boiling. To the question, "Why is the water boiling?"
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one can respond by explaining how heat excites the molecules of the wa
ter, "thus causing a transition from a liquid to a gaseous state." Haught
continues, "A second way to answer the question is to say the water is
boiling 'because I turned on the gas burner.' And still a third response is
to say that the water is boiling 'because I want tea'" (pp. 70-71). Haught
claims that these different levels of explanation are, and must be, logically
distinct explanations in that they "cannot be reduced to or mapped onto
one another." He goes on: "Each [explanation] adds something important
to an understanding of why the water is boiling, and it does so without
conflicting or competing with the others" (p. 71). The first and third expla
nations of why the water is boiling are analogous to scientific and theologi
cal explanations, respectively, of such phenomena as why there is life, or
why there exists anything at all. While science can give a thoroughgoing
explanation of how life arose, there is room for a theological explanation
alongside the scientific.
However, a problem arises here for Haught's account. We can give vari
ous accounts of why the water is boiling because we have access to a varied
set of data. First, through science, we have access to how heat affects the
movement of molecules. Second, through introspection, we have access to
our desires and how they affect our actions. This is clearly disanalogous
with explanations as to why there is life. While we have scientific access to
the phenomenon of life, Haught gives no account of how we might have
theological access to the phenomenon. It seems Haught is looking to sci
ence to guide theological explanation. He warns, "Theology must avoid
any attempt to make room for divine action in yet uncharted scientific
territory" (p. 70). However, if these two kinds of explanation are "logically
distinct" in the way Haught argues, scientific explanation will give little
guidance for developing theological explanation. Access to our own sub
jectivity also seems of little help unless we have some reason for equating,
or claiming strong similarity between, our own and a divine mind. While
the notion of layered explanation is important, Haught gives no account
of what might justify explanations at a theological level.
This leads to the second problematic aspect of Haught's account that I
would like to discuss. Since theological explanations are closer to ultimate
explanations than any scientific claim can be, Haught argues that they are
necessarily more vague and metaphorical. While this may very well be
true, it does not follow thereby that theological explanations need not be
grounded in clear, literal truths. To say "Jesus is the rock of my salvation,"
is clearly to make a metaphorical claim. Yet, this claim only has mean
ing if it can be conceptually linked to some literal understanding. Here,
the claim has meaning given the understanding that solid rock is the best
foundation on which to build any substantial structure. A link to literal
understanding is missing in much of Haught's discussion.
This problem is most clearly seen in Haught's notion of anticipation.
Haught describes the universe as anticipatory in nature. This is clearly
metaphorical. How are we to understand this metaphor? Haught links
the anticipatory nature of the cosmos to the anticipatory nature of critical
intelligence. But, critical intelligence is an aspect of subjective conscious
ness. How is the universe anticipatory though non-conscious? Haught
suggests this anticipation is seen in the universe's openness to future
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possibilities. This openness is shown, for example, in the emergent prop
erties of life and mind. But, anticipation as openness to possibilities is
simply contingency. It seems Haught's point is simply that the universe
has a contingent future. However, Haught seems to want much more
conveyed by his notion of anticipation, but what exactly is unclear. For
example, much of what Haught suggests has an Aristotelian flavor in
each existing thing being drawn to imitate an unmoved mover. This is
not the kind of theological explanation to which Haught ascribes. Yet,
there seems little in his notion of anticipation that will help him distin
guish his conclusions from such an explanation.
One way of understanding Haught's account is as a Plantingian critique
of evolutionary naturalism from within a process theological approach.
As such this is an interesting synthesis of divergent approaches to natural
theology. Whether Haught has moved that critique forward is too complex
an issue for me to treat in this review. The problems I have tried to identify
in Haught's account stem from difficulties basic to the natural theological
enterprise—from where do we obtain our theological concepts, how does
our theological language contact our everyday experience. Haught's is an
interesting attempt to deal with these difficulties.

A theism : A Very Short Introduction, by Julian Baggini. Oxford University

Press, 2004. Pp. 119. US $9.95 (paperback).
AGNALDO CUOCO PORTUGAL, University of Brasilia, Brazil
It is a short but very provocative book. The aim is to provide atheists with
a thought organizer and a handy, quick explanation of their ideas for non
atheists. This ambitious goal of defending a whole worldview in such a
short book is pursued in six chapters and a conclusion, in addition to some
references and indications for further reading.
The first and the second chapters are the most important. Chapter one
is dedicated to a clarification of what atheism is about. Baggini proposes
that we overcome the prejudice not only that atheism is evil and threaten
ing, but also that it is essentially a negative position, parasitic on postula
tions of supernatural/transcendental realities. According to him, there is
a positive stance that better characterizes the view he is defending, which
he calls 'atheist physicalism' (p. 6). According to atheist physicalism, only
the natural world exists, and the stuff of the natural world is essentially
physical, which means that spirits, souls, and ideas detached from physi
cal apparatuses are not part of the world. Baggini stresses, however, that
this position should not be taken as a form of eliminative materialism,
according to which anything that is not physical or material does not
exist. Although atheist physicalism postulates that there is only physical
matter in the universe, it also claims that out of that sole substance come
minds, beauty, love, and 'the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness
to human life' (p. 6). In summary, atheism is a form of naturalism and
physicalism rather than a negative view dedicated to denying religion.

